Exclusive no more? Athens Convention cruise injury claims after MH v Costa Crociere
On 4 June 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered a groundbreaking judgment in MH v Costa Crociere SpA (Case C‑629/24), addressing the relationship between the Athens Convention on maritime passenger liability and the Package Travel Directive (PTR).
The potential significance of this decision cannot be overstated. Contrary to conventional understanding, passengers injured during the course of carriage may, in principle, now have two potential routes to compensation:
- a claim against the carrier under the Athens Convention; and
- a claim against the cruise organiser under the Package Travel Directive.
Until now, the foundation of such claims had been the understanding that the Athens Convention constituted an exclusive liability regime. However, the CJEU has held otherwise. Contrary to the view long accepted by practitioners in this field, consumers may, in principle, choose between different defendants and legal frameworks, provided they do not obtain double recovery for the same loss.
Athens Convention and PTR
The EU Package Travel Directive introduced a harmonised regime of consumer protection for package holidays and linked travel arrangements, imposing liability on organisers for the performance of the package and requiring insolvency protection for travellers. In the UK, the directive was implemented through the Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018.
The Athens Convention, incorporated into UK law through retained EU legislation, governs claims for personal injury sustained by passengers during the course of sea carriage, including cruise voyages between embarkation and disembarkation. By Article 14, the convention was intended to provide the exclusive legal framework governing passengers’ claims against carriers.
Thus, where a holidaymaker suffered personal injury in the course of carriage, the appropriate cause of action lay against the carrier pursuant to the Athens Convention only. At least, this was the widely understood position before the CJEU’s decision in MH v Costa Crociere SpA.
MH v Costa Crociere SpA: the background
The case arose from two French actions involving passengers who suffered personal injuries while on cruise holidays, with one claim brought by MH, and the other by DI/DM. In both cases, claims were brought not only against the cruise carrier, but also against the travel organiser responsible for selling the package holiday.
The underlying French proceedings produced inconsistent results. In MH, the Court of Appeal ultimately found the passenger solely responsible for her accident, whereas in DI/DM, the Court of Appeal upheld findings of liability against both the carrier and the organiser.
The defendants appealed, and questions were referred to the CJEU concerning whether the Athens Regulation provides the exclusive liability regime for injuries occurring during sea carriage, or whether claims may also be brought under the Package Travel Directive.
The CJEU’s decision
The CJEU held that, where a consumer purchases a cruise constituting a package holiday and suffers personal injury during the cruise, the consumer may choose between two distinct causes of action.
First, the passenger may pursue the organiser under the Package Travel Directive for non-performance or improper performance of the package travel contract.
Second, the passenger may bring a claim directly against the maritime carrier under the Athens Regulation and Athens Convention regime.
The court rejected the argument that the Athens framework excludes all other forms of liability. Instead, it concluded that the Package Travel Directive continues to operate alongside the maritime liability regime. The court’s reasoning appears to be that the exclusivity of the Athens Convention is directed at the applicable liability regime rather than the existence of alternative causes of action. In other words, whilst a passenger may be entitled to pursue a claim under another legal framework, such as the Package Travel Directive, that claim remains subject to the substantive limitations imposed by the Athens Convention. Accordingly, the convention’s rules governing liability, including the burden of proof and financial limits on compensation, continue to apply even where the claimant elects to proceed against a package holiday organiser rather than the carrier.
The court also emphasised that passengers cannot recover twice for the same loss. Multiple causes of action may exist, but compensation must remain limited to the actual damage suffered.
Areas of uncertainty
The judgment leaves a number of practical questions unanswered.
Which Athens Convention rules apply to organisers?
As explained above, the CJEU suggested that certain limitations contained within the Athens regime may also affect claims against organisers. However, it is not entirely clear which aspects of the convention transfer across, and which do not.
Notably, the judgment itself says little about limitation periods. Indeed, one of its most striking features is the absence of any substantive discussion of Article 16 of the Athens Convention. This omission has prompted suggestions that claimants may seek to argue that the convention’s limitation period does not apply to claims brought against organisers under the PTRs.
The Athens Convention generally imposes a two-year limitation period for passenger injury claims. By contrast, if a claim under the PTRs is characterised as a personal injury claim under domestic law, the ordinary limitation period in England and Wales would generally be three years pursuant to the Limitation Act 1980. Claimants may now seek to rely on Costa Crociere in an attempt to avoid the more restrictive limitation regime imposed by the Athens Convention.
Furthermore, claims pursued under the PTRs are generally founded upon the organiser’s contractual responsibility for the performance of the package travel contract. It follows that the terms of the package holiday contract are subject to the statutory framework governing unfair contract terms. Thus, where claimants are entitled to pursue a contractual claim under the PTRs, they may contend that any contractual term seeking to limit or exclude liability must be scrutinised in accordance with those statutory protections. In particular, the law relating to unfair contract terms recognises the imbalance of bargaining power that may exist between contracting parties, and seeks to prevent a party in a stronger bargaining position from imposing liability limitations that would unfairly restrict the rights of an injured claimant to obtain redress.
What happens when the organiser is also the carrier?
Many cruise operators act both as organiser and carrier. The cases before the court involved separate entities, meaning the CJEU did not directly address whether a claimant enjoys the same ‘choice’ where the same company performs both roles.
What is the source of liability?
The court recognised that the organiser may be liable under package travel legislation, but it remains uncertain whether liability should be assessed by reference to domestic contractual principles, Athens Convention concepts, or some combination of the two.
The appropriate framework for assessing liability may depend on the nature of the incident. Where the injury results from the materialisation of a risk ordinarily associated with the carriage of passengers by sea, the principles and liability regime of the Athens Convention may provide the most relevant point of reference. By contrast, where the injury arises from aspects of the holiday more akin to accommodation, hospitality or leisure services, the claim may be more readily analysed through the lens of the PTRs and the organiser’s obligations in respect of the package as a whole.
How might the English courts treat the CJEU’s judgment?
Previous cruise litigation has proceeded on the assumption that where the Athens Convention applies, alternative remedies are limited. Cases such as Jennings v TUI UK Ltd and Mahapatra v TUI UK Ltd considered the PTRs primarily in circumstances where a claimant could not establish that the injury occurred during the period governed by the Athens regime.
Following Brexit, the Athens Regulation continues to form part of domestic law. The PTR 2018 implemented the Package Travel Directive and reflects its substantive provisions. However, both regimes are being reformed, with some significant divergences between them. The UK Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements (Amendment) Regulations 2026 have been enacted, but will not come into force until 6 April 2027. Directive (EU) 2026/1024, which substantially reforms the Package Travel Directive, entered into force in 2026, but member states have 28 months to transpose its provisions into national law. As the regulatory frameworks diverge, there may therefore be scope for the English courts to depart from CJEU case law.
Alternatively, English judges may be reluctant to introduce such a significant departure without a clear legislative mandate. Equally, the consumer protection logic underpinning the judgment is likely to be attractive to claimants and may influence future judicial thinking.
It is unlikely that the English courts’ approach to these issues will become clear until suitable cases come before the courts for determination.
Impact on the Montreal Convention?
A further immediate question arising from the judgment is whether similar reasoning could ultimately affect the Montreal Convention governing international air travel. The Montreal Convention contains its own exclusivity clause similar to that in Athens, and courts in both the United Kingdom and the United States have traditionally interpreted that provision robustly.
The CJEU’s decision does not address this directly, but a prior opinion by Advocate General Norkus commented on this. The Advocate General treated overlapping consumer protection regimes in air travel as permissible and used those authorities to support coexistence between package travel law and carriage conventions. It therefore follows that the CJEU could find a similar interplay between Montreal and the Package Travel Directive should such a case be brought before it.
Historically, English courts have often favoured the exclusivity of international transport conventions. The leading example is Stott v Thomas Cook Tour Operators Ltd, where the Supreme Court held that rights arising from events occurring during air carriage were governed exclusively by the Montreal Convention framework.
The reasoning in MH potentially sits uneasily with the approach adopted in Stott. If passengers now possess alternative statutory routes to compensation notwithstanding the existence of a transport convention, questions may arise as to whether the strict exclusivity analysis traditionally applied under Montreal remains sustainable in every context.
Stott concerned a disabled passenger who was denied the assistance he had requested and was subjected to humiliating treatment during a flight. He brought a claim under EU disability rights legislation seeking compensation for injury to feelings. The Supreme Court held that, although Mr Stott had been treated unfairly and his dignity had been compromised, he could not recover damages because the Montreal Convention provided an exclusive code governing damages claims arising during international carriage by air.
Since the convention does not permit recovery for injury to feelings unconnected with bodily injury, no damages were available. The Supreme Court recognised the unfairness of this outcome, describing it as a ‘grave injustice’ and suggesting that it was an issue to which the international community should give further consideration. Against that background, it is conceivable that the English courts may prove receptive to the CJEU’s more consumer-oriented approach, which seeks to expand the avenues through which injured passengers may pursue redress.
Immediate concerns – insurance
Article 4bis of the Athens Convention imposes compulsory insurance requirements on carriers, whilst Article 50 of the Montreal Convention requires state parties to ensure their carriers maintain adequate insurance.
Insurers may have underwritten policies on the assumption that claims arising during carriage would be brought exclusively under the Athens or Montreal regimes. If claimants are now able to pursue PTR claims in parallel, existing insurance arrangements may not respond in the way carriers, organisers and tour operators assume.
Tour operators should review their insurance arrangements carefully to ensure that such liabilities fall within the scope of existing cover. Failure to do so could expose defendants to uninsured liabilities, potentially resulting in significant financial exposure and disputes with insurers over the scope of indemnity.
Conclusions
The CJEU’s decision reflects a continuing tendency within EU jurisprudence to prioritise consumer protection, even where such an approach may sit uneasily with the textual language of the legislation. By recognising the possibility of parallel claims under package travel legislation, the CJEU has opened the door to arguments concerning limitation, contractual liability, insurance cover and, potentially, the future interpretation of other transport conventions such as Montreal.
The next chapter in Costa Crociere will not be written by the CJEU but by domestic courts. Future litigation is likely to focus on limitation, the scope of Athens protections available to organisers, and the extent to which English courts are willing to depart from the traditional doctrine of exclusivity.
Beyond maritime claims, attention will inevitably turn to whether similar reasoning may ultimately undermine the orthodox understanding of the Montreal Convention. In the meantime, businesses within the travel and cruise industries would be well-advised to prepare for the possibility of overlapping liabilities and the complex litigation and insurance issues that may follow.

