Pregnancy, privacy and protection: lessons from CAS’s decision in Göthberg v Lazio Women

Pregnancy should never be a career-ending disclosure for professional female footballers. Yet that was effectively the position confronted by Swedish footballer Maja Göthberg when contract negotiations with Lazio Women collapsed shortly after she informed the club that she was expecting a child. In June 2026, the Court of Arbitration for Sport stepped in, issuing a landmark ruling that marks a further watershed moment for maternity rights in professional football.

The significance of Göthberg v Lazio Women extends beyond the facts of a single dispute. The award provides the first clear CAS endorsement of FIFA’s maternity protections; confirms that clubs cannot evade responsibility by relying on the absence of a signed contract; and reinforces the confidentiality of pregnancy-related medical information. For sports lawyers and employers alike, it is a decision that warrants close attention.

So, what happened?

Background facts

Swedish footballer Maja Göthberg played for Lazio Women during the 2023/24 season. Appearing in 29 out of 30 official matches, Göthberg was well-recognised as being instrumental in helping the club secure promotion to Serie A Femminile, the highest Italian  professional football league.

With Göthberg’s contract ending on 30 June 2024, she began negotiating with the club for the 2024/25 season, through her agent, Federico Valentino. On 25 June 2024, the agent received a professional offer from the club which he duly passed on to Göthberg. On 9 July 2024, the agent received a first full draft of the contract which reflected identical commercial terms to this offer. Two days later, the club added Göthberg to a WhatsApp group called ‘Lazio Women 2024-25’, and she and the team manager discussed her arrival date, accommodation, and medical assessments.

The day after being added to the WhatsApp group, Göthberg visited her doctor and found out she was pregnant. On 18 July 2024, the club sent through a second full draft of the contract, updating a typographical error in relation to Göthberg’s name. No amendments were made to the substance of the contract.

Göthberg decided to tell the club about her pregnancy before signing her contract, despite being under no obligation to do so. She asked her agent to inform the club of her pregnancy, but to tell them to keep the information strictly confidential. On 18 July 2024 (the same day the club sent through the second draft contract), the agent informed the club secretary and the sporting director of Göthberg’s pregnancy.

Three days later, on 21 July 2024, Göthberg received messages from her teammates who said that the club’s assistant coach had told them the news. Göthberg was shocked and upset by this, since it was so early and she had not even informed her own family about her pregnancy. Göthberg informed her agent who said ‘I clearly told them to keep it as confidential.’

That same day, the club contacted the agent and confirmed that they would not be renewing Göthberg’s contract because of her pregnancy. She was then removed from the Lazio Women 2024-25 WhatsApp group, and at the end of July 2024, the club signed a replacement for her.

DRC proceedings

Having exhausted pre-action correspondence with the club and her lawyers (in which the club denied the conclusion of a contract and having disclosed news of her pregnancy), Göthberg issued a breach of contract claim before FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC). The club did not participate in the DRC proceedings.

On 24 March 2025, the DRC ruled that there was no employment contract between Göthberg and the club, finding that: there was no signed contract; there was no evidence that the club had intended the drafts to be finalised versions of the contract (nor that Göthberg had accepted the draft contract); and the contractual terms themselves had not been finalised. It found that Article 18quater (1) and (2) of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (FIFA RSTP) (reproduced below, as at March 2025) did not apply where there was no concluded employment contract, and therefore could not protect Göthberg.

’18quater Special provisions relating to pregnancy, adoption and family leave

Validity of an employment contract

1. The validity of a contract may not be made subject to the taking of, or the result of, a pregnancy test, the player being or becoming pregnant during its term, being on maternity, adoption or family leave, or utilising rights related to maternity, adoption or family leave in general.

Terminating a contract without just cause and consequences

2. If a club unilaterally terminates a contract on the grounds of a player refusing to take a pregnancy test, being or becoming pregnant, being on maternity, adoption or family leave, or utilising rights related to maternity, adoption or family leave in general, the club will be deemed to have terminated the contract without just cause.a) It shall be presumed, unless proven to the contrary, that the unilateral termination of a contract by a club during a pregnancy or maternity, adoption or family leave occurred as a result of a player being or becoming pregnant, adopting a child or utilising rights related to family leave.’

The DRC also found that the club did not unlawfully discriminate against Göthberg on the basis of sex, relying on the fact that, whilst Göthberg claimed the club had unilaterally terminated a contractual relationship due to her pregnancy, she had no proof of the same.

It further found that there was no evidence the club had disclosed Göthberg’s pregnancy nor that it had breached its duty to act in good faith during the pre-contractual stage.

CAS appeal

On 16 June 2025, Göthberg appealed to CAS. Göthberg submitted that the DRC’s decision was legally flawed, arguing that once she had established, prima facie, that the reason for the club’s discontinuation of employment was her pregnancy, the burden of proof shifted to the club to prove discrimination had not occurred. Göthberg also contended that the DRC had failed to properly assess the documentary evidence she had provided and to correctly apply the FIFA RSTP.

She further submitted that there was a valid employment contract between her and the club despite the lack of signature and that the club was aware of her pregnancy (it was only upon learning this information that Göthberg was removed from the WhatsApp group and her agent was told that the club did not wish to continue the employment relationship). Accordingly, Göthberg submitted that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex, and that the club had (i) breached its duty to act in good faith during contractual negotiations, and (ii) violated her personality and privacy rights by disclosing her pregnancy.

CAS decision

CAS agreed with Göthberg that a signature was not required for a valid contract to be formed, nor to engage the protections of Article 18quater RSTP. To satisfy the prerequisites of the FIFA RSTP, written records of the essential terms of the employment relationship are required. However, the FIFA regulations are otherwise silent on the issue of the formal requirements for the conclusion of football employment contracts, and CAS held that Swiss law should therefore step in to fill that ‘lacuna’.

It noted that employment contracts governed by Swiss law do not require a specific form and can be valid absent a signature (as long as there is a mutual expression of intent by the parties, either expressly or impliedly). They held that Göthberg and the club had reached agreement on the essential contractual terms, there was a documented and mutual expression of intent, and, therefore, a valid contract had been formed, allowing Göthberg to access protections, including those enshrined in Article 18quater.

CAS acknowledged that ‘any narrower interpretation of Article 18quater… would defy the purpose of FIFA’s pregnancy and family protection regime’ and Article 18quater therefore ‘must be interpreted widely’. They also disagreed with the club that Italian law should play any role in this dispute, citing Article 58 of the CAS Code, providing that ‘the Panel shall decide the dispute according to the application regulations’, which are defined in Article 49(2) of the FIFA Statutes as the FIFA regulations and Swiss law.

The rules of law chosen by the parties shall only apply ‘subsidiarily’ according to Article 58 of the CAS Code (the club were seeking to rely on the collective bargaining agreement adopted by the Italian Football Federation for the Serie A Femminile, which provided at Article 2.1 that an unsigned employment contract ‘shall be considered null and void’). The parties’ choice to ‘fully comply’ with the collective agreement in the draft contracts was superseded by the FIFA regulations and Swiss law, and could only become relevant if there was a lacuna in both, but that did not exist here.

CAS also agreed that the club, not Göthberg, unilaterally terminated the contract. While the player bears the burden of proof to demonstrate a unilateral termination of the contract, the burden of proof shifts to the club to show that any proven unilateral termination did not occur on account of the player’s pregnancy (Article 18quater para. 2 lit. a) of the FIFA RSTP). CAS found that the club in this case failed to discharge that burden and therefore the termination did occur on account of Göthberg’s pregnancy.

CAS also stated that it was fully in agreement with the seminal DRC decision in the case of Sara Björk Gunnarsdóttir (FPSD-3626), in which it was stated that clubs have a duty of care to offer alternative employment to pregnant players (see here for further details on the Gunnarsdóttir case). Article 18quater para.4 lit. b) was actually updated in the June 2024 version of the RSTP following the Gunnarsdóttir case, as follows (bold parts added):

‘Should the player deem that it is not safe for her to continue providing sporting services, or should she choose not to exercise her right to continue providing sporting services, the club shall offer the player the possibility to provide employment services in an alternative manner. If she renders employment services in an alternative manner, or if the club is unable to offer alternative employment services that can reasonably be expected in the context of the ongoing contract, the player shall be entitled to receive her full remuneration, until such time that she utilises her maternity leave.’

The club disputed Göthberg’s claim that the agent had informed them that the pregnancy was confidential and asserted that it had not further disclosed the information. However, CAS found that a) the evidence demonstrated that they had disclosed the information and b) the club had violated Göthberg’s personality rights regardless of whether the agent expressly informed the club that the pregnancy was confidential.

CAS acknowledged that ‘It is common knowledge that pregnancies in their early weeks and months face an increased danger of miscarriage, which is why it is important to many women to keep a pregnancy confidential until the pregnancy is considered to be “safe”, usually after the first 12 weeks. This was also the case with the Player, who had not even told her close family about the pregnancy at the time.’

CAS awarded Göthberg compensation in the amounts of:

• EUR 64,000 gross (representing the residual value of the contract), together with 5% interest per annum from 7 August 2024; and
• EUR 5,333 gross (representing compensation for the illegal disclosure of her pregnancy), together with 5% interest per annum from 21 July 2024.

It is to be noted that CAS did demonstrate some sympathy towards the club, as follows:

1. CAS did not award the additional compensation permissible under Article 18quater (3)(a)(iii) (corresponding to six monthly salaries of the terminated contract, intended to be a penalty which seeks to suppress the egregiousness of contract termination due to pregnancy, which legislative goal was to be ‘fully endorsed’ according to CAS).This is because it found that:
   • (a) This case did not represent the typical case Article 18quater had in mind; Göthberg’s pregnancy was disclosed before the season, before arrival at the club, and before the contract was signed or registered. The FIFA RSTP provisions regarding pregnancy are still new, the legal position was complex, and even FIFA’s DRC initially found no contract existed, making the club’s mistaken view understandable.
   • (b) CAS ordered the club to pay the full annual salary (the maximum residual contractual value) despite receiving no services from Göthberg. Given the excusable legal error, CAS considered any additional penalty disproportionate.
   • (c) CAS found that the club acted on an incorrect legal interpretation, including reliance on Italian law, rather than out of malice or deliberate wrongdoing. The club’s representatives were viewed as credible and honest witnesses.
   • (d) Although Göthberg had no duty to offer alternative services, CAS noted there was no direct communication between her and the club, and the agent’s mistaken legal advice contributed to the situation. This weighed against imposing an additional penalty.
2. Göthberg claimed EUR 32,000 for the onward disclosure of her pregnancy by the club, however CAS only awarded EUR 5,333. It held that the contract value was an appropriate reference point for the calculation and determined that one month’s salary was appropriate compensation for this element of Göthberg’s claim. CAS said that it ‘appreciated’ that the information did not become public, and remained within the team.

Wider implications for the post-Gunnarsdóttir landscape of women’s sports

Several key points emerge from Göthberg’s case in favour of maternity rights for female athletes:

• this ruling underscores the importance of maternity rights during contractual negotiations, explicitly confirming that protections apply even where contracts have not been signed. The key question is whether agreement has been reached on essential terms. Players can feel emboldened to challenge clubs who seek to rely on formalities or technicalities to evade contractual responsibilities towards pregnant footballers;
• the ruling also highlights the importance of handling sensitive and confidential information appropriately. CAS was unsympathetic to the club’s claims that they were not told to keep Göthberg’s pregnancy confidential, finding that this should have been obvious and that explicit confidentiality requests are not required to attract privacy protections.

The contrast between the FIFA DRC’s approach in the Gunnarsdóttir case compared to this case does, however, appear striking. In Gunnarsdóttir, the DRC adopted a strongly purposive and protective interpretation of the pregnancy protections in Article 18quater, emphasising that the rules were designed to safeguard female players from financial disadvantage arising from pregnancy and maternity.

By contrast, in this case, despite Göthberg’s allegation that the club refused to proceed with the employment relationship after learning of her pregnancy, the DRC took a far more formalistic approach and concluded that no binding employment contract existed because it had not been signed and registered, resulting in a decision for the club. The two outcomes can therefore be seen as difficult to reconcile: while the DRC in Gunnarsdóttir looked beyond technical arguments to give full effect to the protective purpose of the maternity provisions, in this case it relied on contractual formalities in a way that effectively denied Göthberg the benefit of those same protections.

This tension was thankfully addressed by CAS, who reaffirmed the protective objectives of the FIFA framework, albeit without awarding additional penalty compensation. Göthberg’s victory is a welcome ruling in an otherwise sparse landscape of case law on this subject, and marks further support for maternity rights on the playing field.

This article was co-authored by trainee solicitor Puja Patel.