LP v MP: conduct and misconduct in financial remedy proceedings

In the recent judgment of LP v MP, a financial remedy matter, Mr Justice Cusworth handed down a judgment which financially penalised the wife for her coercive and controlling behaviour towards the husband.

Whilst the facts surrounding the misconduct involved in this case were unusual, and on the more extreme side, this judgment is useful to practitioners to see the potential impact of conduct on the principle of sharing in financial remedy proceedings.

The wife’s conduct involved, but was not limited to physical, verbal and emotional abuse, lying to the husband that she was becoming a High Court judge when she was not, and requesting large sums of money to fund her professional career.

Despite acknowledging what Lord Burrows and Lord Stephens set out in Standish, being that ‘…the sharing of the matrimonial property should normally be on an equal basis. Although there can be justified departures from that, equal sharing is the appropriate and principled starting position…’, [1] Mr Justice Cusworth was confident that this case was one in which the starting position of equal sharing should be departed from.

Mr Justice Cusworth, taking the wife’s conduct and lack of financial contribution into account, decided to reduce the wife’s sharing entitlement to a half of the 60% of the total matrimonial assets, saying that, ‘I am satisfied that a fair outcome for both parties is that 40% of the wife’s prima facie entitlement is deducted on account of her complete lack of contribution, the absence of which is rendered significantly more acute when considered through the glass of her deplorable conduct.’[2]

He also decided to regard a property, which the wife had owned prior to the marriage, as matrimonial. This was by virtue of the husband loaning the wife £135,000 to pay off the mortgage on the property in question. It is arguable whether this loan should have resulted in the property being ‘matrimonialised’, or whether it could more accurately have been considered the wife’s property over which the husband had a repayable loan. No doubt judges will continue to grapple with the question of what constitutes matrimonialisation, as well as how conduct should be dealt with in these cases.

It should also be noted that, when considering needs, Mr Justice Cusworth took the view that the wife should no longer be maintained at the marital standard of living going forward.[3] Unusually in this case, the victim of the abuse (husband) was the financially stronger party.  Often where these issues are present the concern is to ensure that the financially weaker party, and victim of abuse, is properly provided for. In this case, as Mr Justice Cusworth acknowledges, the husband would be comfortable if the wife’s claims were met at any reasonable level.  The decision to impact the wife’s standard of living by the level of the award suggests a more robust approach to conduct, regardless of which party’s conduct is under scrutiny.

Other cases concerning conduct

However, this case should be considered with other recent conduct judgments in mind; for example, those decided by Mr Justice Peel, such as N v J [2024] EWFC 184, and the Court of Appeal decision in Goddard-Watts v Goddard-Watts [2023] EWCA Civ 115, both of which were considered by Mr Justice Cusworth in this case.

Lady Justice Macur in Goddard-Watts noted that, ‘the accepted view to be derived from these authorities is that the misconduct envisaged by section 25(2)(g) must necessarily be quantifiable in monetary terms rather than seen as a penalty to be imposed against the errant partner’[4].  However, she went on to accept that the husband’s conduct in that case was ‘the glass’ through which the case should be considered, although that would not necessarily mean an increased award.

In turn, Mr Justice Peel has consistently been of the view that if conduct is to be considered, it must be proved that ‘there is an identifiable (even if not always easily measurable) negative financial impact upon the parties which has been generated by the alleged wrongdoing’.[5] In N v J,[6] Mr Justice Peel noted examples of cases which successfully illustrate this causative link, for example FRB v DCA (No 2) [2020] EWHC (Fam), which involved the wife allowing the husband to believe that he was the child’s biological father and therefore experienced financial damage by virtue of funding the child’s upbringing.[7]

Mr Justice Peel’s strong opinion that the conduct should result in ‘an identifiable financial impact’[8] differs from the approach taken by Mr Justice Cusworth in LP v MP, where his focus was on Standish, and the justified departure from the sharing principle and the statutory test that the conduct must be ‘inequitable to disregard’. Mr Justice Cusworth notes that the higher courts have set the threshold at a very high level, but himself feels that this approach could cause unfairness to victims of violent and coercive, controlling behaviour.[9]

Recent judicial interpretation has shown at least two lines of thought in respect of how conduct should be treated, and there will no doubt be further case law developments in this area. Until such time as the law may become more settled, conduct cases will continue to carry with them an element of uncertainty and will be judged on a case by case basis.

This article was written by Farida Hindi, trainee solicitor in the family team.

[1] Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26, [50]

[2] LP v MP [2025] EWFC 473, [47]

[3] Ibid, [53]

[4] Goddard v Watts [2023] EWCA Civ 115, [71]

[5] Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2023] EWFC 130, [43]

[6] N v J [2024] EWFC 184

[7] N v J [2024] EWFC 184, [32]

[8] N v J [2024] EWFC 184, [37]

[9] LP v MP [2025] EWFC 473, [43]