Kiveli collision with Afina I – once engaged, rule 14 applies until the risk of collision has passed
A recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Monford Management Ltd v Afina Navigation Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 251 provides the English court’s most detailed exposition to date on the interpretation of rule 14 of the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGS).
A recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Monford Management Ltd v Afina Navigation Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 251 provides the English court’s most detailed exposition to date on the interpretation of rule 14 of the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGS).
The case concerned an appeal from a decision of the Admiralty judge, Mr Justice Bryan, in respect of a collision between the bulkers Kiveli and Afina I off the south coast of Greece at 06:01 local time on 13 March 2021. Essentially, having failed to keep a proper lookout, Kiveli made a hard turn to port about two minutes before the collision (C-2), which resulted in her bow striking the port side of Alfina I in way of her no 4 cargo hold at an angle of approximately 90˚. Mr Justice Bryan found Kiveli 80% to blame for causing the incident.
A ‘fatal turn to port’
The Admiralty judge had held that there was a risk of collision from about 05:39 (C-22), when the vessels were 8.688 nautical miles apart and the reciprocal angle between their respective headings was 7˚. The vessels were each displaying two white masthead lights, port (red) and starboard (green) sidelights, and a white stern light. The vessels were in sight of one another by radar and visually, and each was able to see the masthead lights of the other in line or nearly in line.
The judge did not feel able to make findings as to what either vessel could or did see of the other’s sidelights, but nonetheless held that a head-on situation existed according to rule 14 of the COLREGS, which reads as follows:
‘(a) When two power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of collision each shall alter her course to starboard so that each shall pass on the port side of the other.
(b) Such a situation shall be deemed to exist when a vessel sees the other ahead or nearly ahead and by night she could see the mast head lights of the other in a line or nearly in a line and/or both sidelights and by day she observes the corresponding aspect of the other vessel.
(c) When a vessel is in any doubt as to whether such a situation exists she shall assume that it does exist and act accordingly.’
The reciprocal angle between the vessels’ headings reduced to 5.3˚ by 05:49 (C-12) and to 4.1˚ by 05:52 (C-8) as a result of a couple of ‘nibbling’ turns to port by Kiveli. By around C-7.5, according to the nautical assessor who assisted Mr Justice Bryan, the relative bearing of the vessels was sufficient to say that Afina I could see Kiveli as being ‘fine to starboard’, rather than ‘ahead or nearly ahead’. At 05:54 (C-7), Afina I used her Aldis lamp to signal Kiveli, but Kiveli did not see the signal, as it had negligently failed to keep a proper lookout.
Afina I made a series of alterations to starboard between C-6 and C-4, such that the reciprocal heading increased to 5.7˚. At about 05:59 (C-2), Kiveli switched to manual steering and commenced its ‘fatal turn to port’, which the judge described as ‘catastrophic (and negligent)’. Consistent with the advice of the nautical assessor, the judge found that Kiveli should have made a bold alteration to starboard, which would have resolved the collision risk.
Court of Appeal
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, comprising Lord Justice Coulson, Lord Justice Nugee, and Lord Justice Foxton, the owners of Kiveli contended that the Admiralty judge had misapplied rule 14. They argued that rule 14(b) set out the definition of what constituted vessels meeting on ‘reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses’ for the purposes of rule 14(a), and had to be complied with.
The appellants further contended that the stipulations regarding sidelights in annex I paragraph 9 of the COLREGS affected how rule 14(b) should be interpreted. Annex I paragraph 9 provides for each sidelight to be visible up to a maximum of 3˚ on the opposite side of the centreline. Allegedly, therefore, in order to be on ‘nearly reciprocal courses’ for the purposes of rule 14(a), vessels had to be on headings within 3˚ to port or starboard of each other’s centreline.
Furthermore, the appellants argued that the rule 14(b) wording requiring that a vessel can ‘see the mast head lights of the other in a line or nearly in a line and/or both sidelights’ means that when the sidelights are in range, all that matters is whether both sidelights are visible. In other words, the use of ‘and/or’ is intended to mean that the visibility of the mast head lights is only relevant at an earlier time when only the mast head lights are within range.
The Court of Appeal did not accept that rule 14(b) imposed any geometric requirement with regard to sidelights. There was no reference to the requirements of annex I paragraph 9 either in rule 14 or elsewhere in part B of the COLREGS. There was also nothing in the legislation’s travaux préparatoires to suggest that the draftspersons had intended the meaning of ‘nearly reciprocal courses’ to be confined to a 3˚ arc to port or starboard of the centreline.
Giving the leading judgment, Lord Justice Foxton also observed that the words ‘and/or’ in rule 14(b) should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and there was nothing in the text of the COLREGS to indicate otherwise. Furthermore:
‘The Appellants’ construction could involve a sudden change in the application of Rule 14(b) as the observing vessel came within sidelight range, even though it may not be aware of the practical cut-off of the observed vessel’s sidelights and even though weather conditions may make observing both sidelights difficult even within visual range.’
The question of whether rule 14(b) sets out the definition of ‘meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of collision’ for the purposes of rule 14(a), or was merely an example of such a situation, was left over for another case in which it might be determinative.
The appellants also contended that there came a point during the vessels’ approach when the vessels were no longer on nearly reciprocal courses. Therefore, the prevailing risk of collision ceased to qualify as a head-on situation within the meaning of rule 14 and instead became a crossing situation pursuant to rule 15.
Consistent with the Admiralty judge, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument. Rule 14 does not expressly state any circumstances in which it will cease to apply. Rather, it ‘clearly contemplates that the Rule will continue to apply, requiring a course change so that “each shall pass on the port side of the other”’. Once engaged, therefore, rule 14 applies until the risk of collision has passed. This approach affords certainty as to which rule applies while the same risk of collision persists, and is consistent with the object and purpose of the COLREGS.
As both grounds of appeal failed, there was no basis for reopening the Admiralty judge’s 80:20 apportionment of liability for the collision.
The presence of nautical assessors
The appellants had also expressed some surprise at the commencement of the hearing due to the absence of any nautical assessors. In this regard, paragraph 26B of Practice Direction 52C states that in a collision case ‘involving issues of navigation or seamanship, the Court of Appeal will, unless the court otherwise orders, be assisted by two nautical assessors’. The default position, therefore, is that nautical assessors should be present.
Fortunately, the Court of Appeal was able to reorganise the hearing to take place a week later with two distinguished assessors present. Lord Justice Coulson emphasised in his judgment that ‘[i]t is important to ensure that this unsatisfactory situation … is not repeated. Paragraph 26B of PD52C needs to be looked at again by the Civil Procedure Rules Committee, …’ In the meantime, ‘[t]he parties, and in particular the appellant, must be encouraged to be more proactive, and the question of assessors should be dealt with by the LJ giving permission…’ In view of the failure of the grounds of appeal, the assistance of nautical assessors was ultimately not needed.